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Le Chatelier principle in replicator dynamics
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1)Yerevan Physics Institute, Alikhanian Brothers Street 2, Yerevan 375036, Armenia
2) USC Information Sciences Institute, 4676 Admiralty Way, Marina del Rey, CA 90292, USA
The Le Chatelier principle states that physical equilibria are not only stable, but they also resist
external perturbations via short-time negative-feedback mechanisms: a perturbation induces pro-
cesses tending to diminish its results. The principle has deep roots, e.g., in thermodynamics it is
closely related to the second law and the positivity of the entropy production. Here we study the
applicability of the Le Chatelier principle to evolutionary game theory, i.e., to perturbations of a
Nash equilibrium within the replicator dynamics. We show that the principle can be reformulated as
a majorization relation. This defines a stability notion that generalizes the concept of evolutionary
stability. We determine criteria for a Nash equilibrium to satisfy the Le Chatelier principle and
relate them to mutualistic interactions (game-theoretical anticoordination) showing in which sense
mutualistic replicators can be more stable than (say) competing ones. There are globally stable
Nash equilibria, where the Le Chatelier principle is violated even locally: in contrast to the thermo-
dynamic equilibrium a Nash equilibrium can amplify small perturbations, though both this type of
equilibria satisfy the detailed balance condition.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Cc, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
An external influence disturbing an equilibrium state
of a system induces processes tending to diminish the re-
sults of the disturbance. This is the qualitative content
of the principle formulated by Le Chatelier for chemical
reactions [1]. Earlier statements of the principle are re-
viewed in [2]. Braun related the principle to the second
law and extended it to general thermodynamic equilibria
[3, 4]. In contrast to the second law, the Le Chatelier
principle is more operational and more intuitive; hence
it became the main tool for predicting the response of
physical and chemical equilibrium [1, 3, 4]. Applications
of the principle go well beyond physics and chemistry: in
economics it is used for the analysis of price equilibrium
[5]; in ecology for explaining qualitatively the ecosystems
growth [6, 7], and also for quantifying the threshold of
allowed influences of civilization on the environment [8].
The principle gave rise to the concept of homeostasis, a
state of an organism or construction that is stable due to
compensatory mechanisms [2].
The issue of stability is also central to population dy-
namics and ecology: to a large extent these disciplines
emerged and developed around various aspects of the
stability notion and its relations to diversity, productiv-
ity, complexity etc [9]; see [10] for a recent review. The
question of understanding pertinent forms of stability is
presently more pending than ever in face of various envi-
ronmental issues and global changes.
Our purpose here is to develop a formalization of the
Le Chatelier principle for a game-theoretical population
dynamics and to show that it leads to a notion of sta-
bility that allows to make new predictions. In particu-
lar, the Le Chatelier principle differs from the asymp-
totic stability [11], where—once a (small) perturbation
is over—the equilibrium is recovered after a sufficiently
large time (relaxation) 1. It is however not excluded that
in the course of relaxation the perturbation will be tran-
siently amplified, a scenario forbidden by the Le Chate-
lier principle. While the asymptotic stability indicates
on long-time negative feedback (perturbation does decay
sooner or later), the principle means a short-time nega-
tive feedback.
Our setup is the the replicator dynamics, a basic de-
scription of the Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) and
population dynamics [9, 12–14]. This dynamics origi-
nated in 1930’s as a population approach to genetics [13].
Later on it merged with game theory [14] and with math-
ematical ecology [9]. It has a wide range of applications
from biology, ecology and economics [9, 13, 14] to physics
[17] and combinatorial optimization [18]. EGT describes
large populations of agents (humans, animals, microbes,
genes) interacting via playing a game. Changes in these
populations are driven either by the application of de-
cision rules by individual agents, or by natural selection
via different reproduction rates [12–14]. EGT related the
Nash equilibrium of a static game to attractors of dynam-
ics [12–14], thereby likening the Nash equilibrium to the
thermodynamic equilibrium. EGT also put forward the
concept of evolutionary stability, a widely used notion
related to stability with respect to invasions [12–14].
Here we show that i) for perturbations of an asymp-
totically stable Nash equilibrium the Le Chatelier prin-
ciple can be reformulated as a majorization relation. ii)
the criterion for the principle relates to mutualistic [co-
operative] interactions between agents (game-theoretical
1 But asymptotic stability is more than relaxation. It includes
the notion of Lyapunov stability: for any vicinity A of the fixed
point, there is its subset B such that the motion that starts in
B never leaves A. There are examples of relaxing, but unstable
fixed points [11].
2anticoordination). iii) A weaker formulation of the Le
Chatelier principle, which demands that a perturbation
is at least not amplified 2, provides a stability concept
with a wider applicability than the evolutionary stability,
e.g., the principle can be applied to permanent replica-
tors that do not possess an asymptotically stable state.
iv) Non-mutualistic (competitive or prey-predator) in-
teractions can violate even the weak formulation of the
principle, i.e., small perturbations over an asymptotically
stable Nash equilibrium can be amplified. This is impos-
sible for thermodynamic equilibria and shows that Nash
equilibria can be endowed with positive feedback.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II intro-
duces the Le Chatelier principle and explains its meaning:
II B states a weaker version of the principle and shows
its relations with multiple perturbations. Section III
recalls the replicator dynamics and the main features of
the Nash equilibrium. In particular, section III B explain
why the notion of Nash equilibrium is indeed similar to
the thermodynamic equilibrium, while section III C re-
views the concept of evolutionary stability and relates it
with the notion of mutualism as the whole. Section IV
obtains the criteria of the Le Chatelier principle for the
replicator dynamics. Section V studies the principle for
concrete population games. The last section concludes
and makes connections with previous works and ideas.
II. LE CHATELIER PRINCIPLE
A. The formulation
The standard formulation of the principle in equilib-
rium thermodynamics refers to small perturbations of
extensive variables (volume, number of particles for a
certain substance, etc) [4]. The linear non-equilibrium
thermodynamics formulates the principle via fluxes and
forces again for small deviations from equilibrium [20,
21]. In contrast, we need a formulation that works
within the non-equilibrium statistical mechanics ap-
proach, where the basic quantities are probabilities of
states satisfying certain equations of motions. Such a
formulation should refer to not necessarily small pertur-
bations of the autonomous equations of motion.
Let a system is described by a probability vector from
the simplex Sn:
x ∈ Sn : xT ≡ {xk ≥ 0}nk=1,
∑n
k=1
xk = 1, (1)
where the probabilities xk refer to occupation of various
states in the population, and where xT means transpo-
sition of the column x. In statistical physics the index k
2 More precisely, a violation of the weak Le Chatelier principle
means that the perturbation is amplified, and simultaneously
the perturbed system is destablized; see below.
typically refers to (free) energy levels or to phase-space
cells [3]. In population dynamics k refers to groups of
agents having certain common features (traits). The in-
terior of Sn is given by xk > 0 and
∑n
k=1xk = 1.
Let x(t) satisfy a continuous-time master equation:
dxi(t)/dt ≡ x˙i =
∑n
k=1
Wik[x]xk,
∑n
i=1
Wik[x] = 0,(2)
where Wi6=k[x] ≥ 0 is the transition probability k → i,
and
∑n
i=1Wik[x] = 0 follows from
∑n
k=1xk = 1. Eq. (2)
is the base for non-equilibrium statistical mechanics,
chemical kinetics and population dynamics [22]. Wi6=k[x]
may depend on x (non-linear case), as in the Boltzmann
equation [22] or in the replicator equation [13, 14]. When
Wi6=k does not depend on x (linear case), (2) refers to the
one-time probability a continuous-time Markov process 3.
Let pT = {pk > 0}nk=1 be an asymptotically sta-
ble rest-point of (2). A sudden perturbation at time t
brings the system from p to some x(t) from the attrac-
tion basin of p. The perturbation is quantified via ratios
{xk(t)/pk}nk=1. We re-number these ratios as
x↓1(t)/p
↓
1 ≥ x↓2(t)/p↓2 ≥ . . . ≥ x↓n(t)/p↓n. (3)
Thus x↓1(t) [x
↓
n(t)] is the largest [smallest] component of
perturbation. The solution of (2) is a smooth function of
time. Hence the ordering (3) holds at time t + ǫ with a
small ǫ > 0:
x↓1(t+ ǫ)/p
↓
1 ≥ x↓2(t+ ǫ)/p↓2 ≥ . . . ≥ x↓n(t+ ǫ)/p↓n. (4)
If all inequalities in (3) are strict, the transition from (3)
to (4) is obvious, since ǫ → 0 and x(t) is a continuous
function. If some of them are equalities, ordering (3) is
not unique, but it can be chosen such that (4) holds4.
Perturbations can have external origin, or be related to
intrinsic noise. In the latter scenario (2) arises as a de-
terministic approximation to a random dynamics [14], so
that the remnants of noise can be described as rare ran-
dom perturbations.
3 The case when Wik[x] does depend on x is frequently described
in literature as a non-linear Markov process [34, 35]. There are
pros and cons for this. If one stays at the level of the one-time
probability x(t) the linear and non-linear situation share several
common features [34–36], e.g. in both cases the future is deter-
mined by the present only (no influence of the past is to be taken
into account), and in both cases there is at least one stationary
(i.e. time-independent) probability vector (a consequence of the
Bauer’s fixed point theorem). However, it was stressed that a
stochastic process is determined by its multi-time probabilities,
and from this viewpoint the non-linear equation (2) does not
correspond to any well-defined stochastic process [37].
4 Note that although the ordering (3) is thereby conserved for short
times, it need not be conserved for long times, simply because
this ordering is not unique if some relations in (3) are equalities.
Hence it is possible (for t1 < t2 < t3) that x(t1) and x(t2) are
ordered simularly (in the sense of (3)), x(t2) and x(t3) are also
ordered simularly, but x(t1) and x(t3) are not ordered simularly.
3To formulate the Le Chatelier principle gradually as-
sume first that n = 3. According to (3), x1 is the
strongest component of the perturbation. Short-time
negative feedback means that it decays: x↓1(t+ǫ) ≤ x↓1(t).
Likewise, x↓3(t) is the smallest component of the pertur-
bation. It may be close to zero making the correspond-
ing group vulnerable to extinction due to intrinsic noise
[14]. The Le Chatelier principle requires negative feed-
back mechanisms increasing x↓3(t): x
↓
3(t + ǫ) ≥ x↓3(t).
Combining this with the above condition on x↓1(t) we ob-
tain (5) for n = 3. For n > 3 we note that we may define
the sum x↓1(t) + x
↓
2(t) as the largest component of the
perturbation and demand its decay in time. Likewise,
x↓n(t) + x
↓
n−1(t) can be taken as the smallest component
demanding its non-decrease in time. Hence we come to
the following formulation for the Le Chatelier principle to
hold for times t ∈ [0, T ] for perturbation x(t) (ǫ→ 0+):∑m
k=1
x↓k(t+ ǫ) ≤
∑m
k=1
x↓k(t), 1 ≤ m ≤ n, (5)
with the equality for m = n. Taking ǫ→ 0 in (5) we get:∑m
k=1
x˙↓k(t) ≤ 0, 1 ≤ m ≤ n. (6)
This formulation can be presented in an equivalent form.
Eqs. (5, 3, 4) imply 5 that for any convex [f ′′(y) ≥ 0]
function f(y) one has [23–25]:∑n
k=1
pkf(xk(t+ ǫ)/pk) ≤
∑n
k=1
pkf(xk(t)/pk), (7)
which after taking the limit ǫ→ 0+ reduces to∑n
k=1
x˙kf
′(xk(t)/pk) ≤ 0, f ′(x) = df/dx. (8)
The converse holds as well [23–25]: (7, 3, 4) imply (5) 6.
Eq. (7) holds for all convex functions f(y), if it holds for
special classes of convex functions; see Footnote 6. For
an illustration of (7) take, e.g., f(y) = |1− y|. Then (7)
will demand time-decay of
∑n
k=1|pk−xk(t)|, which is an
intuitive measure of the perturbation magnitude. Many
other such intuitive measures are inlcluded in (7) [30].
5 Define Ak(t) ≡
∑k
l=1x
↓
l
(t) and Qk ≡ [f(
x
↓
k
(t)
p
↓
k
) −
f(
x
↓
k
(t+ǫ)
p
↓
k
)]/[
x
↓
k
(t)
p
↓
k
−
x
↓
k
(t+ǫ)
p
↓
k
]. Note that Q1 ≥ ... ≥ Qn due
to the convexity of f(y) and to (3, 4). Put A0(t) = A0(t + ǫ) =
0. Now
∑n
k=1 p
↓
k
[
f(
x
↓
k
(t)
p
↓
k
)− f(
x
↓
k
(t+ǫ)
p
↓
k
)
]
=
∑n
k=1Qk{Ak(t) −
Ak−1(t) − [Ak(t + ǫ) − Ak−1(t + ǫ)]} =
∑n−1
k=1 [Ak(t) − Ak(t +
ǫ)] [Qk −Qk+1] ≥ 0 due to (5) and An(t) = An(t + ǫ) [25].
6 To deduce (5) from (7, 3, 4) we take in (7) a convex function
fm(y) = max[y−
x↓
m
(t)
p
↓
m
, 0] and obtain (5) via
∑m
k=1p
↓
k
(
x
↓
k
(t+ǫ)
p
↓
k
−
x↓
m
(t)
p
↓
m
) ≤
∑m
k=1p
↓
k
fm(x
↓
k
(t + ǫ)/p↓
k
) ≤
∑n
k=1p
↓
k
fm(x
↓
k
(t +
ǫ)/p↓
k
) ≤
∑n
k=1p
↓
k
fm(x
↓
k
(t)/p↓
k
) =
∑m
k=1p
↓
k
(
x
↓
k
(t)
p
↓
k
−
x↓
m
(t)
p
↓
m
).
Eq. (8) implies that a function F [x(t); f ] =∑n
k=1pkf(xk(t)/pk) monotonously decays in time to its
minimum f(1), which is reached for x = p. Convexity
of f implies that f(1) is both local and global minimum
for F [x(t); f ]. In contrast to asymptotic stability, which
always relates to some Lyapunov function [31], the Le
Chatelier principle requires a specific class of Lyapunov
functions; see Footnote 6 for one choice of such a class.
Conditions (3, 4, 5) amount to the definition of ma-
jorization order known in different areas of probability
theory [23–26] and applied to master equations in [18, 27–
29]: x(t) majorizes 7 x(t+ ǫ) relative to p
x(t) ≻p x(t+ ǫ), ǫ→ 0 + . (9)
Note: i) p ≻p x leads to x = p, as follows from (5) and
the fact that (3) implies 1 ≤ x↓1(t)/p↓1 ≥ x↓n(t)/p↓n ≤ 1. ii)
x(t) ≻p p for any x(t). This follows from the convexity
of f(x) in (7) and means that being extended to long
times, the Le Chatelier principle becomes equivalent to
asymptotic stability of p: x(t) ≻p x(t+∞) = p. Hence
one interpret (9) in terms of ”information distance” [26]:
x(t+ ǫ) is closer to p than x(t).
B. Weak formulation of the Le Chatelier principle
When applying the Le Chatelier principle (6, 3, 4), it
will prove convenient to separate the case where some of
conditions (6) [or (5)] are violated, but not all of them
are violated simultaneously. This will be refered to as the
weak formulation of the Le Chatelier principle: although
the perturbation is not diminished, it is also not ampli-
fied. The weak formulation does not imply asymptotic
stability, but still it prevents strong unstabilities. If all
inequalities in (6) [or in (5)] are reversed, we get pertur-
bation amplification that is in sharp contrast to the Le
Chatelier principle. The weak formulation can be applied
to stable [but not asymptotically stable] rest-point.
In the stability theory one typically studies conse-
quences of a single perturbation. It is recognized that the
standard measures of stability are insufficient for treating
a sequence of multiple perturbations [32]. The Le Chate-
lier principle treats this situation, e.g. a violated weak
principle would mean that a sequence of weakening per-
turbations may drive the system towards the boundaries
of (1), where the extinction risks are sizable.
Another way of weakening the formulation (5, 6) of
the Le Chatelier principle is to require only decrease of
the largest component of the perturbation and increase
of the smallest component: x˙↓1 ≤ 0 and x˙↓n ≥ 0. For
n ≥ 4 this differs from (6). Likewise, a stronger [than
7 For a finite ǫ, where (3) and (4) need not hold simultaneously,
conditions (3, 4, 5) differ from (7). This is reflected by calling
the former (latter) p-majorization (d-majorization) [25].
4(5,7)] formulation is also possible: one may require the
relation (5, 3, 4) to hold not only for ǫ → 0+, but also
for all ǫ > 0. Both are worth exploring, but are not at
focus here.
C. Linear master-equation
Eqs. (7, 8) hold if in (2) Wik does not depend on x
(linear master-equation)[23–30]. For a small ǫ and arbi-
trary x(t) > 0 we write (2) as x(t + ǫ) = Πx(t), where
Π is a stochastic matrix, Πik ≡ δik + ǫWik ≥ 0 and∑n
i=1Πik = 1, with Πp = p. Now (7) follows after rep-
resenting its left-hand-side as
∑n
k=1
pkf
(
1
pk
∑n
i=1
Πkipi
xi(t)
pi
)
(10)
and employing convexity of f(x) via 1pk
∑n
i=1Πkipi =
1. Eqs. (7, 8) holds [via the same argument (10)]
for the non-linear Boltzmann master equation that de-
scribes equilibration of an closed macroscopic system [28].
Thus, for perturbations over thermodynamic equilibria
we confirmed the Le Chatelier principle from within non-
equilibrium statistical physics.
Note however that the argument (10) does not auto-
matically apply to all non-linear master-equations, since
in general Wik[x] does not leave invariant the rest-point∑n
k=1Wik[x]pk 6= 0, even if it is globally stable.
III. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
A. Equations of motion
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) describes selec-
tion processes in a population of interacting agents di-
vided into groups [replicators] [13]. The growth of each
group is governed by its fitness, which depends on inter-
group interactions. The frequency of the group k is
xk = Nk/
∑n
k=1Nk, where Nk is the number of agents
in the group k. The simplest choice for the fitness φk of
the group k 8 is a linear function of frequencies [13]:
φk[x] =
∑n
l=1
aklxl, k = 1, . . . , n, (11)
where the payoffs akl account for the interaction between
(the agents from) groups k and l. The replicator equation
x˙i = xi(φi[x]−
∑n
k=1
xkφk[x]) (12)
equates the growth per capita x˙i/xi to the fitness of
group i minus the average fitness
∑n
k=1xkφk[x] [13, 14].
8 This does not imply that the approach necessarily refers to the so
called group selection, although such a reference is not excluded;
see [33] for a recent careful discussion.
Eq. (12) is invariant with respect to aik → aik+ c˜k, where
c˜k is any constant. We set c˜k such that {akk = 0}nk=1.
Solutions of (12) do not leave the domain (1); if xk = 0
at an initial time it stays zero for all times.
Eq. (12) can be interpreted via a symmetric game
played by two participants I an II [13, 14]. Here the
groups correspond to strategies of the play, while aik (aki)
is the pay-off received by I (II) when applying strategy i
against k (k against i). xi is the probability of applying
the strategy i; {xk}nk=1 do not depend on the player, since
the game is symmetric. Hence
∑n
k=1 aikxk is the average
pay-off received by I in response to applying the strategy
i [13]. Now (12) refers to the feedback between applying
a strategy and the pay-off received for it [13, 14].
Eq. (12) can be derived from the non-linear master
equation (2) under suitable choice of Wi6=k[x] [13, 14]:
Wi6=k[x] = xi(K + φi[x]− φk[x])/2, (13)
where K is a constant ensuring Wi6=k[x] ≥ 0 (transition
probability is non-negative). Wkk[x] is found from nor-
malization
∑n
i=1Wik[x] = 0. Hence the transition proba-
bility Wi6=k[x] of an agent from group k to i is facilitated
by the probability xi of that group and the fitness differ-
ence. The choice (13) is not unique. Other options, e.g.,
Wi6=k[x] = xi(K1 + φi[x]), have a different meaning, but
lead to the same equation.
The meaning of ak 6=l is best illustrated by rewriting
(12) via {Nk}nk=1:
N˙i = Ni
∑n
k=1
aikxk, xk =
Nk
N
, N =
∑n
l=1
Nl. (14)
Now ak 6=l =
δ[N˙k/xk]
δNl
describes the change of the relative
growth of the group k due to a small change δNl in the
group l. Recalling that all = 0, we have four possibilities
for the interaction between k and l [9]:
ak 6=l > 0, al 6=k > 0 : mutualism (15)
ak 6=l < 0, al 6=k < 0 : competition (16)
ak 6=l > 0, al 6=k < 0 : k predates l. (17)
Fourth possibility is that l predates k.
For the game-theoretical meaning of (15, 16) recall that
we consider a symmetric game, where {alk} and {akl}
are the pay-off matrices for players I and II, respectively.
Hence all > ak 6=l and all > al 6=k (competition) means
that I and II will tend to coordinate their actions. Like-
wise, mutualism relates with anticoordination.
Applications of replicator dynamics include: i) Socio-
biology, where the replicators correspond to the strate-
gies of agent’s behavior, while xk is the probability by
which an agent applies the strategy k [13]; xk can change
due to inheritance, learning, imitation, infection, etc.
ii) Genetic selection, where xk is the frequency of one-
locus allele k in panmictic, diploid population, and where
akl = a
′
kl + a
′′
k combines the selective value a
′
kl = a
′
lk of
the phenotype driven by the zygote (kl) and the selective
5value a′′k of the gamete (k)
9 [13, 15, 16]. Eq. (12) with
such a pay-off matrix {akl} was proposed in 30’s within
population genetics, where it describes selection dynam-
ics [13, 15, 16]. iii) Lotka-Volterra equations of ecological
dynamics [13]. iv) Quantum feedback control, where the
replicator equation (12) comes out from the Schroedinger
equation and the pay-offs are anti-symmetric (zero-sum
game): akl = −alk [17]. v) Solution of hard combinato-
rial optimization problems and genetic algorithms [18].
B. Nash equilibrium
If (12) admits a rest-point pT = {pk > 0}nk=1, then
∑n
k=1
aikpk = φ, pi =
∑n
k=1(a
−1)ik∑n
l,m=1(a
−1)lm
, (18)
where the fitness φ does not depend on i: coexisting
groups are equally fit. If the rest point p > 0 exists, it is
unique among all probability vectors with strictly posi-
tive components, since generically (modulo small changes
in aik) the matrix A = {aik}ni,k=1 is invertible [12]. Due
to (18) the Nash equilibrium condition holds for p [q is
any probability vector]
∑n
i,k=1
qiaikpk ≡ qTAp ≤ pTAp (19)
with the equality sign [13]. Eq. (19) means that a player
applying the strategies with probability vector p does
not get incentives for a unilaterial change p → q. A
Nash equilibrium need not be a stable rest point of the
replicator dynamics [12–14].
The fact that at a Nash equilibrium coexisting groups
are equally fit can be related to the detailed balance, a ba-
sic notion of the thermodynamic equilibrium [22]. A sta-
tionary state of (2) means: p˙k = 0 for k = 1, . . . , n. Since
(2) can be written as p˙i =
∑n
k 6=i(Wik[p]pk −Wki[p]pi),
an additional feature of such a stationary state is that
Wik[p]pk = Wki[p]pi for all i 6= k, (20)
i.e. transitions from one group to another are in the de-
tailed balance [22]. This condition holds for the ther-
modynamic equilibrium, where it relates to the time-
inversion invariance of microscopic (Hamiltonian) equa-
tions of motion [22]. Now (13) and (18) imply that a
Nash equilibrium also satisfies the detailed balance con-
dition, one reason to regard it as an extension of the
thermodynamic equilibrium.
9 Note basic limitations of this selection model [13, 15, 16]: the re-
combination is ignored; differences between the sexes are ignored,
e.g. one ignores the fact that the female and male gametes can
have different selective values; it is assumed that the one-locus
gene does not determine the sex.
The satisfaction of the detailed balance was noted for
a class of other game-theoretical models [38]. The au-
thors of [38] also relate the game-theoretical fitness to the
chemical potential. There is a clear analogy here: sur-
viving species have equal fitness at a Nash equilibrium,
while chemical potentials of interacting systems are equal
in the thermodynamic equilibrium.
C. Evolutionary stability
1. Standard viewpoint
We recall the concept of evolutionary stability, which
(for symmetric games) refines the Nash equilibrium and
is widely involved in applications [12–14]. Below we see
how the Le Chatelier principle generalizes this notion.
A Nash equilibrium (18, 19) is evolutionary stable if
for any probability vector x > 0 [13]
xTAx− pTAx = (xT − pT)A(x− p) < 0, (21)
where in the last expression we used (xT − pT)Ap = 0.
It follows from the fact that
∑n
k=1 aikpk does not depend
on the index i [see (18)] and that
∑n
k=1(xk − pk) = 0.
The game-theoretical meaning of (21) is that albeit the
Nash condition (19) holds with equality for any x 6= p,
such x cannot become a Nash equilibrium, since p fairs
better against any x. Eqs. (21, 12) imply the Lyapunov
feature for g(x,p) =
∑n
k=1pk ln
pk
xk(t)
:
dg(x,p)
dt
= xTAx− pTAx < 0, (22)
and g(x,p) ≥ 0 with g(x,p) = 0 if and only if x =
p > 0. Evolutionary stability implies global stability,
because due to (19, 21) there are no other internal Nash
equilibria. In this sense evolutionary stability refines the
notion of the Nash equilibrium, which need to be neither
unique nor stable. But the evolutionary stability does
not extend to asymmetric games, since they do not have
asymptotically stable interior Nash equilibria [13].
Since g(x,p) is a convex function of xk(t)pk , one cannot
get all the inequalities in (5) [or (7)] reversed. Hence evo-
lutionary stability implies the weak Le Chatelier princi-
ple. The converse is not true: there are situations, where
the asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium is not evolu-
tionary stable, but the weak Le Chatelier principle holds
[see below]. The necessary and sufficient condition for an
interior Nash equilibrium p to be evolutionary stable is
deduced from (21) and
∑n
i=1(xi − pi) = 0: the matrix
{ a[s]in + a[s]kn − a[s]ik }n−1i,k=1 (23)
is positive definite. Here a
[s]
ik ≡ 12 [aik + aki].
62. Mutualism in the whole and evolutionary stability
The evolutionary stability can be given a more general
meaning related to the population being mutualistic in
the whole [15]. Eqs. (12, 14) show that the overall num-
ber of agents N =
∑n
k=1Nk in the population evolves as
N˙ = N
∑n
k=1aikxkxi ≡ Nφ[x], where φ[x] is the average
fitness. Note that N and x are independent variables.
Let there be another population with the same pay-
offs {akl}, but with different parameters x′ and N ′ (fre-
quencies and the overall number of agents). If these two
polulations are joined together, the number of agents
in each group k becomes Nk + N
′
k. The speed of
the overall number of agents in the joint population is
(N + N ′)φ[λx + (1 − λ)x′], where λ = NN+N ′ , xk = NkN
and x′k =
N ′
k
N ′ . The mutualism in the whole demands that
the speed of the overall number of agents in the joint pop-
ulation is larger than the sum of separate speeds [15]:
λφ[x] + (1− λ)φ[x′] ≤ φ[λx + (1− λ)x′]. (24)
Since 0 < λ < 1, (24) amounts to the average fitness φ[x]
being a concave function of x on the simplex Sn [15]. Let
now (24) holds for any two probability vectors x and x′.
Assuming x ≈ x′ in (24) and expanding it over a small
x−x′, we get qTAq ≤ 0 for any vector q with∑nk=1qk =
0. This is condition (21) for the evolutionary stability.
Note that the mutualism in the whole does not mean that
separate inter-group interaction are also mutualistic in
the sense of (15). Vice versa, the mutualistic interactions
do not imply the mutualism in the whole; see below for
a concrete example. The Le Chatelier principle implies
the mutualism in the whole due to (22).
IV. CRITERIA OF THE LE CHATELIER
PRINCIPLE FOR REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
A. Criteria for a given perturbation
Below we determine conditions under which the repli-
cator equation (12) leads to the Le Chatelier principle
(5, 6) with respect to the rest point p > 0. We assume
that perturbations satisfy x(t) > 0. Hence we exclude
invasive perturbations, where some of pk’s nullify, and
extinctions, where some of xk(t)’s nullify. Write (12) as
x˙i =
∑n
k=1
Vik[x]xk, Vik[x] ≡ xi(aik −
∑n
l=1
xlalk).(25)
Generally, Vi6=k[x] is not a transition probability, but it
leaves intact an internal Nash equilibrium p > 0:∑n
k=1
Vik[x]pk = 0, (26)
because φ in (18) does not depend on the index i.
Let for certain pay-offs a˜ik the corresponding V˜i6=k be
positive for all pairs i 6= k
V˜i6=k[x] ≥ 0 or a˜i6=k ≥
∑n
l=1
xla˜lk. (27)
Then Πik[x] = δik + ǫV˜ik[x] is a stochastic matrix with
Πp = p due to (26). Hence (10) applies and (27) suffices
for the validity of the Le Chatelier principle (5, 6).
If now (27) holds for at least one x > 0 (with∑n
k=1 xk = 1), it leads to
∑n
k=1xla˜lk ≥ 0 (recall that
a˜kk = 0), which combined with (27) produces
a˜i6=k ≥ 0 for all pairs i 6= k, (28)
i.e., mutualism or anticoordination; see (15, 16).
Let us now assume that the principle holds for a per-
turbation x(t): x(t) ≻p x(t + ǫ). Then it is shown
in Ref. [24] that there exists a stochastic matrix—which
for our purposes can be taken as Πik[x] = δik + ǫV˜ik[x]
with V˜i6=k[x] ≥ 0—such that Π[x]p = p and x(t + ǫ) =
Π[x]x(t) or x˙i(t) =
∑n
k=1 V˜ik[x]xk(t).
We define from (25) the corresponding pay-off ma-
trix: a˜ik[x] =
V˜ik[x]
xi
− V˜kk[x]xk , where a˜kk[x] = 0 due to∑n
i=1 V˜ik[x] = 0. Now a˜ik[x] admits the Nash equi-
librium p and satisfies (27). Since aik and a˜ik[x] gen-
erate the same local flow, the pay-off matrix cik[x] ≡
aik− a˜ik[x] admits another Nash equilibrium x(t) besides
p; see (19). Hence, det [cik] = 0; see (18).
Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for the
Le Chatelier principle (5, 7) to hold with respect to a
perturbation x(t) > 0 over the internal Nash equilibrium
p > 0 is that the pay-off matrix aik is represented as
aik = a˜ik[x] + cik[x], (29)
where a˜ik[x] satisfies (27) and has the Nash equilibrium
p, while the matrix cik[x] has two Nash equilibria, x(t)
and p. Using (25) we get the analogue of (29) for gener-
ators:
V [x] = V˜ [x] + Γ[x], V˜ [x]p = Γ[x]p = Γ[x]x(t) = 0,(30)
where Γik[x] = xi(cik[x]−
∑n
l=1xlclk[x]), and where V˜ [x]
satisfies (27). Eq. (30) refers to hidden (by Γ[x]) mutu-
alism (or anti-coordination).
The weak Le Chatelier principle holds for a perturba-
tion x(t), if x(t) 6≺p x(t + ǫ) [ǫ → +0]. Now x(t + ǫ) =
(1+ǫV [x])x(t) leads to x(t) = (1−ǫV [x])x(t+ǫ), so that
the criteria for the weak principle is read-off from (30):
V [x] 6= −V˜ [x] + Γ[x], V˜i6=k[x] ≥ 0, (31)
where Γ[x] satisfies the same conditions as in (30).
Eqs. (31, 15, 16) show that violations of the weak princi-
ple relate to hidden (by Γ[x]) competition (coordination).
B. Local validity of the principle
Local means that we consider small perturbations:
xi(t) − pi ≪ pi. Studying local perturbations is im-
portant, since most of perturbations arising due to in-
ternal noise will be small. Another reason is that
7locally (around an asymptotically stable interior rest-
point) many different dynamic evolutionary approaches
are equivalent [13]. We linearize (12, 25) around p:
ξ˙i =
∑n
k=1
Vik[p]ξk, ξi ≡ xi − pi, (32)
where we used (18). The local stability is governed
by the matrix Vik[p]. The determinant of Vik[p] (and
thus at least one of its eigenvalues) is zero, because∑n
i=1 Vik[p] = 0. All other eigenvalues of Vik[p] have
negative real part, because p is assumed to be asymptot-
ically stable.
The criteria for the local validity of the Le Chatelier
principle amount to changing x → p in (30). Alterna-
tively, we can proceed directly from (32) and demand
validity of (9) for ξ(j) = ε[x(j) − p], where ε ≪ 1 is a
small parameter, and x(j)T = {δjk}nk=1. We then con-
clude that the principle holds for all local perturbations
if and only if Vi6=k[p] ≥ 0, or
ai6=k ≥
∑n
l=1
plalk for all pairs i 6= k. (33)
Note that mutualism (ai6=k ≥ 0) follows from (33), but
does not suffice for the validity of the Le Chatelier princi-
ple for all local perturbations. The game-theoretic mean-
ing of (33) is that when responding to a pure strategy k,
it is better to use any other pure strategy i than to re-
spond via the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy p.
Eq. (8) implies that if the principle holds for all local
perturbations, and if f(x) is smooth [recall f ′′(1) > 0],
d
dt
∑n
k=1
ξ2k
pk
≤ 0. (34)
The converse is not true: though for local perturbations
(34) does not depend on the form of f for a class of func-
tions f(x), it does not suffice for the local validity of the
Le Chatelier principle [recall that the class of functions
in Footnote 6 is not smooth]. Put differently, the local
Le Chatelier principle is not a consequence of the evolu-
tionary stability that also produces (34) locally; cf. (34,
22) with (33) and see section VC for an explicit example.
By analogy to phenomenological non-equilibrium ther-
modynamics, (34) is sometimes presented as the state-
ment of the Le Chatelier principle for population dynam-
ics; see [45] and references therein. We stress that (34)
is only a necessary condition for the local principle.
We have the following interplay of the mutualism con-
cepts and their relation to the Le Chatelier principle: the
mutualism in the whole (evolutionary stability) does not
imply (15), but prevents weak violations of the principle.
The validity of the local principle requires conditions (33)
which are stronger than the mutualism in the whole.
V. THE LE CHATELIER PRINCIPLE FOR n = 3
A. Global validity of the principle
Note that n = 3 (three groups) is the simplest non-
trivial situation, because for n = 2 the Le Chatelier prin-
ciple coincides with the notion of asymptotic stability: an
internal asymptotically stable state exists only for mutu-
alistic interactions, where (33) holds trivially.
Eq. (27) for n = 3 reduces to 10.
min[a˜k 6=i, a˜j 6=i] ≥ xka˜k 6=i + xj a˜j 6=i, i, j, k = 1, 2, 3. (35)
For the Le Chatelier principle (6) to hold for the whole
simplex (1), we need cik = 0 in (29), and (35) produces:
a12 = a32 ≥ 0, a21 = a31 ≥ 0, a13 = a23 ≥ 0. (36)
Hence the global validity of the Le Chatelier principle
relates to symmetrically mutualistic pay-offs. Under less
restrictive assumptions one can still get the principle
valid for the most of perturbations; see Fig. 1 and dis-
cussion below. Moreover, for n = 3 we observed that
an interior, stable Nash equilibrium always has pertur-
bation domains, where the Le Chatelier principle holds,
and that these domains include the Nash equilibrium, or
the latter is contained at their boundary; see Figs. 1–3.
Recall that the converse is guaranteed: the Le Chatelier
principle implies asymptotic stability, since it is related
to the existence of a family of Lyapunov functions (8).
B. Barocentric parametrization
Below we study examples displaying concrete scenarios
for (in)validity of the principle. For the sake of illustra-
tion we make another simplification assuming that the
asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium is barocentric 11:
p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/3. (37)
Then the pay-off matrix can be parametrized as
 0 a12 a13a21 0 a23
a31 a32 0

 =

 0 ϑ+ b1 ϑ− b1ϑ+ b2 0 ϑ− b2
ϑ+ b3 ϑ− b3 0

 , (38)
10 Resolving these inequalities is a straightforward task in linear
programming; here is one example of solutions of (35): a˜12 ≤ a˜32,
a˜21 ≤ a˜31, a˜13 ≤ a˜23,
x1
1−x2
≥ 1 − a˜21
a˜31
, a˜13
a˜23
≥ x2
1−x1
≥ 1 − a˜21
a˜31
.
This is a triangle embedded into the simplex (1).
11 Assuming that there is a Nash equilibrium p > 0, one can make
the barocentric transformation: x′i =
xi
pi
/[
∑3
k=1
xk
pk
], which
maps the original replicator equation to the one with variables
x′i and payoff coefficients a
′
ik
= aikpk [12]. The Nash equilib-
rium in the new representation coincides with (37). The baro-
centric transformation respects stability features of a rest-point
[12], though the conditions of the Le Chatelier principle [as well
as the conditions for evolutionary stability] are not respected.
However, due to
x˙′
i
x′
i
= x˙i
xi
− d
dt
ln[
∑
k
xk
pk
], if the principle holds
in coordinates x, it at least weakly holds in coordinates x′.
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FIG. 1: (Color online.) The structure of (12) on the sim-
plex (1) [0 < x1, 0 < x2, 0 < x1 + x2 < 1] containing
globally stable Nash equilibrium (37) (bold dot) for n = 3
and ϑ = 1; see (38). Fig. 1(a): b1 = b2 = b3 = 0.3.
Fig. 1(b): b1 = b2 = b3 = 0.99. The Le Chatelier principle
supporting domain is shaded normally (blue). Light (blue)
shaded domains support only the weak principle, where both
strongest and weakest components of a perturbation grow.
Meshed domains also support only the weak principle, but
now both strongest and weakest components of a perturba-
tion decrease. Such domains are absent for the situation pre-
sented on Fig. 1(a). The Nash equilibrium on Fig. 1(b) is not
evolutionary stable, but still globally stable.
where ϑ and bi are real parameters. Putting (38) into
(32) we get for two non-zero eigenvalues of Vik[p]:
[−ϑ±
√
b1b2 − b1b3 + b2b3 ]/3. (39)
Third eigenvalue of Vik[p] is zero. For asymptotic sta-
bility the real parts of (39) have to be negative; hence
ϑ > 0. We can take ϑ = 1, since the magnitude of ϑ can
be rescaled with the characteristic times.
The barocentric condition (37) means that the Nash
equilibrium is maximally mixed and that the (minus) en-
tropy
∑n
k=1 xk(t) lnxk(t) is included in the class (7) of
Lyapunov functions.
C. Mutualistic replicators
They are defined by condition aik ≥ 0 = akk. An
internal Nash equilibrium need not exist for mutualistic
replicators, but if exists, then (at least for n = 3) it is
globally stable; cf. (39) under |bi| ≥ 1 and Footnote 11.
Let us now show that for mutualistic replicators the
weak principle holds, at least for n = 3. Recall (31)
and the discussion after it. If the weak principle were
violated there would exist a 3× 3 matrix aik+ a˜ik whose
non-diagonal (diagonal) elements are positive (zero), and
whose determinant is zero (since it supports two internal
[linearly independent] Nash equilibria). It is clear that
such a matrix does not exist 12.
For the case (38) the mutualism (15) amounts to |bi| ≤
ϑ = 1. For n = 3 the criteria of evolutionary stability
reduce from (23) to
a
[s]
13 ≥ 0, 4a[s]13a[s]23 ≥ (a[s]13 + a[s]23 − a[s]12)2. (40)
To illustrate various stability notions, let us assume that
ϑ = 1 > bi = b > 0. Now (39) implies that the Nash
rest-point (37) is asymptotically stable. The evolution-
ary stability (40) is more restrictive, since it demands
b <
√
3/2. The validity of the Le Chatelier principle for
all local perturbations is even more restrictive, since it
demands b < 1/3; see (33) and Fig. 1. Recall that the
weak principle always holds for mutualistic replicators.
Hence the weak principle is more general than the evolu-
tionary stability, and the latter does not imply the local
validity of the principle.
Note that the weak Le Chatelier principle has the fol-
lowing two scenarios of validity: i) perturbations leading
to growth, because both the weakest and the strongest
component of the perturbation increase; ii) perturbations
leading to decay, since now both the weakest and the
strongest component decrease. Other types of pertur-
bations for n = 3 will either violate the weak princi-
ple or satisfy the proper principle. It should be clear
that during the second scenario the system in a sense
destablizes, because smaller sizes of groups means larger
extinction risks. It is seen from Figs. 1 and 3 that gen-
erally both scenarios for the weak Le Chatelier principle
are present. However, we observed that whenever for
mutualistic replicators the principle holds for all local
perturbations, the domains that support only the weak
principle are exclusively of the first type: they suppport
the growth of population and not its decay; see Fig. 1(a).
This observation indicates that the local condition (33)
does a play a certain global role as well.
D. Asymptotically, but not globally stable
rest-point
For n = 3 there are two possibilities for the repli-
cator dynamics with an asymptotically stable, interior
(and generic!) Nash equilibrium p > 0 [12]. (i) it is
globally stable: for all solutions with x(0) > 0 it holds
x(t→∞)→ p. (ii) One of the vertices [vertex is a prob-
ability vector whose one component is 1] is also asymp-
totically stable. This is the only vertex that is stable
with respect to the boundary directions, and no other
stable rest-points exist besides this vertex and p. The
vertex is also evolutionary stable, and thus the interior
rest-point is not evolutionary stable; otherwise it had to
12 We believe this argument holds more generally, but we were not
able to formalize it for n ≥ 4.
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FIG. 2: (Color online.) The local structure of (12) around
asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium (37) under conditions
(41). The parameters in (38) are: ϑ = 1, b1 = 2, b2 =
1.2, b3 = 2. The Nash equilibrium (37) is asymptotically
stable (with real eigenvalues of the linearized matrix Vik[p])
but not globally stable, another asymptotically stable Nash
equilibrium is x1 = x2 = 0. The Le Chatelier principle sup-
porting domain is shaded normally (blue). The domain where
the weak principle is violated is shaded dark gray. Domains
supporting only the weak principle are left blank. Three thick
dashed lines are x2 = x1, x2 = 1− 2x1 and x2 = (1 − x1)/2;
as indicated, they bound regions with six different types of
ordering. Ordinary lines denote typical trajectories of (12)
moving towards (37) located at the crossing of three thick
dashed lines.
be a unique Nash equilibrium [13]. We now turn to dis-
cussing the case (ii).
Let replicators 1 and 2 be mutualistic, but 1 gains more
than 2 from this mutualism: a12 > a21 > 0. Repli-
cator 3 predates on 1 (a13 < 0, a31 > 0), but com-
petes with 2: a23, a32 < 0 (in a sense 2 saves 1 from
3). Hence the vertex x3 = 1 is asymptotically stable; see
(12). There can be also an internal asymptotically stable
state if (paradoxically) 3 competes and predates strongly
enough. Within parametrization (38) all the above con-
ditions are satisfied for
ϑ = 1, b1 > b2 > 1, b3 >
b1b2 − 1
b1 − b2 > b2 > 1, (41)
where b3 >
b1b2−1
b1−b2
comes from the asymptotic stability
of the internal rest-point (37); see (39). Eq. (41) de-
scribes a generic situation with two asymptotically sta-
ble rest-points. Their attraction basins are detached by
a separatrix that joins two rest points: x1 = 1 and
(x1 = 0, x2 =
2b2−2
b2+b3−2
).
The internal rest-point (37) is asymptotically stabi-
lized by the assumed mutualism between 1 and 2. How-
ever, with respect to the Le Chatelier principle this rest-
point is fragile: there are local perturbations that violate
the weak principle 13; see Fig. 2.
There are three types of perturbations for this situa-
tion: (1) supporting the Le Chatelier principle; (2) sup-
porting the weak Le Chatelier principle only; (3) vio-
lating the weak Le Chatelier principle, i.e., transiently
amplifying perturbation. Domains of the type (1) can
be divided further into subdomains (1.1), where the tra-
jectory remains confined to that domain for all times,
i.e., (9) holds for all ǫ > 0, and subdomains (1.2), where
the short-time response follows the Le Chatelier princi-
ple, but for intermediate times the trajectory leaves the
domain. For the case shown in Fig. 2 all the trajecto-
ries end up in subdomains of the type (1.1). Circulation
of trajectories around the Nash equilibrium is excluded,
since the eigenvalues (39) are real.
E. Rock-scissors-paper [RSP] game
Cyclically dominant species are observed in nature and
have certain unexpected features [40, 41]. The cyclic
dominance was proposed to be one of the basic mech-
anisms for maintaining diversity; see [40, 41] and refs.
therein. Their simplest model is the RSP game, where
[recall that akk = 0]:
a12, − a21, − a13, a31, a23, − a32 (42)
are all positive meaning cyclic dominance; see (15–17).
The negativity of a21, a13, a32 implies that for RSP
the Le Chatelier principle cannot be satisfied for all lo-
cal perturbations; see (33). For the case (38) the RSP
conditions (42) amount to b1 > ϑ > 0, b3 > ϑ > 0 and
b2 < −ϑ < 0. As the right Fig. 3 shows, provided that
|bi|’s are sufficiently different from each other, even the
weak Le Chatelier principle can be violated in the vicin-
ity of the globally stable Nash equilibrium (37). Thus
cyclically dominating species can amplify small pertur-
bations. The left part of Fig. 3 displays a scenario, where
the principle is valid for four particular domains, while
the weak principle holds everywhere. The situation with
the zero sum game aik = −aki is very similar to the
left Fig. 3. Here the internal rest point p is only neu-
trally [not asymptotically] stable, i.e. x(t) does not con-
verge to p. However, the time-average converges to p:∫ T
0
dt
T x(t) → p for T → ∞ [13]. Although the notion
of asymptotic stability does not apply, the Le Chatelier
principle stays well-defined. We see an interplay between
various notions of stability: RSP-replicators can violate
13 If this system of three replicators is kept under weak noise, then
(sooner or later) the separatrix will be crosed, the system will ap-
pear in the attraction basin of the vertex x3 = 1 and irreversibly
settle there. It is suggestive that this decay of the interior Nash
equilibrium will (more probably) take place through the region,
where the weak Le Chatelier principle is violated.
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FIG. 3: (Color online.) The structure of (12) on the simplex
(1) with globally stable Nash equilibrium (37) (bold dot) for
n = 3 and ϑ = 0.5; see (38). Fig. 3(a): b1 = 1, b2 = −1, b3 =
2. Fig. 3(b): b1 = 1, b2 = −1, b3 = 3. The Le Chate-
lier principle supporting domain is shaded normally (blue).
Light (blue) shaded domains support only the weak princi-
ple, where both strongest and weakest components of a per-
turbation grow. Meshed domains also support only the weak
principle, but now both strongest and weakest components of
a perturbation decrease. Regions violating the weak principle
are shaded dark.
the weak principle around an asymptotically stable rest-
point [see the right Fig. 3], but neutrally stable zero-sum
replicators satisfy the weak principle.
F. Summary
We now briefly summarize results obtained for three
replicators for perturbations over an asymptotically sta-
ble, interior (and unique) Nash equilibrium.
• The Nash equilibrium is always in (or at the bound-
ary of) the domain, where the Le Chatelier princi-
ple holds.
• The principle holds locally (i.e., for sufficiently
weak perturbations) under condition (33) that im-
plies mutualism.
• Whenever the principle holds locally, all other per-
turbations do not destabilize the system.
• Violations of the principle (or of its weak form) can
show up already for arbitrary weak perturbations.
• The weak principle holds for an evolutionary stable
Nash equilibrium. Even for such an equilibrium,
the principle can be violated locally.
• The weak principle (and for certain perturbations
the full principle) does hold for zer-sum replicators,
whose Nash equilibrium is only neutrally stable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we applied the Le Chatelier principle
to replicator dynamics of Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) aiming to understand how stability features of a
Nash equilibrium resemble those of the thermodynamic
equilibrium. Analogies between these two type of equi-
libria were noted at several instances [38, 39]; e.g., they
both satisfy the notion of detailed balance (20).
The Le Chatelier principle states that a perturbation
of an equilibrium state starts to diminish already on short
times, in contrast to asymptotic stability, where pertur-
bations are supposed to decay sooner or later. The Le
Chatelier principle had several predecessors in natural
philosophy [2] and is widely known beyond its original
application domain of quasi-equilibrium thermodynam-
ics [1, 5–8]. However, its quantitative formulations is not
widely known 14. Hence our first step was to reformu-
late the Le Chatelier principle for a non-linear master
equation—a common framework for statistical physics
and population dynamics—and relate it to the majoriza-
tion concept. We were led to distinguish between the
proper Le Chatelier principle (perturbation induces neg-
ative feedback) and its weak vesion (perturbation does
not induce strong positive feedback).
Our results led to refining the notion of Nash equilib-
rium and evolutionary stability. The first result is that
the validity of the Le Chatelier principle relates to mutu-
alism. Other notions of stability (e.g., asymptotic stabil-
ity) do not allow to indicate in which sense the mutualism
can be more stable than other forms of interactions that
also lead to an asymptotically stable [or even globally
stable] interior rest-point 15. This conclusion points at a
stability-based mechanism for explaining the emergence
and maintenance of mutualistic interactions.
More generally, we noted that the viewpoint of the
Le Chatelier principle allows to uncover rich scenarios of
behaviour for a stable Nash equilibrium under perturba-
tions. There are always perturbation domains, where the
Le Chatelier principle is satisfied, but there are also per-
turbation domains, where only the weak principle holds.
Moreover, certain non-mutualistic [e.g., cyclically com-
peting] replicators with a single globally stable Nash equi-
librium are capable of violating even the weak Le Chate-
lier principle, i.e., they are endowed with a strong form
of positive feedback (weaker forms of positive feedback
are possible already when only the weak principle holds).
This is impossible for perturbations over a thermody-
14 Even within its original domain the formulation of the Le Chate-
lier has several delicate (but rather important) points that are
normally not recognized in literature; see [4] for a careful deriva-
tion of the principle within quasi-equilibrium thermodynamics.
15 The notion of the evolutionary stability can be related to the mu-
tualism in the whole; see (24. However, the latter concept does
connect in any direct way to mutualistic inter-group interactions
in the sense of (15).
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namic equilibrium, since there it would mean a negative
entropy production.
The existence of positive feedback mechanisms is rec-
ognized in ecology at several instances. It is argued
that younger [on the evolution scale] natural ecosystems
have more positive feedback mechanisms than older ones,
where negative feedback dominates [9]. In macroevolu-
tion dynamics positive feedback is essential for the punc-
tuated equilibrium: most species persist for ages without
showing any significant morphological change [equilib-
rium], but they do display relatively sudden changes via
a positive-feedback response after specific perturbations
[19]. Hence before the punctuation starts, the equilib-
rium state should be stable, but it cannot be ”equally sta-
ble” with respect to all possible perturbations. Clearly,
this combination of various forms of stability (or rather
various forms of feedback) can be quantified via the Le
Chatelier principle.
We focussed on perturbations over an asymptotically
stable (interior) Nash equilibrium. The Le Chatelier
principle applies to replicators satisfying a weaker form of
stability: permanence (or Lagrange stability) that rules
out the extinction of any replicator that was present in
the population initially [9, 13]. Some important classes
of replicators—e.g., those playing an asymmetric [two-
population] or a zero-sum game—can be only permanent,
e.g., for them a Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically
stable (or even not stable, as for hypercyclic replicators)
[13, 14]. One problem with this type of stability is that
a sequence of relatively weak perturbations may drive
replicators towards the simplex boundary, where the ex-
tinction risks are high [32]. The weak Le Chatelier prin-
ciple will guarantee the absence of such a scenario, and
its application to this situation is straightforward, be-
cause a permanent system of replicators (12) does have
a unique (but generally not stable) interior Nash equilib-
rium p > 0, with time-averaged state converging to p:∫ T
0
dt
T x(t) → p for T → ∞ [13]. An example of study-
ing permanence via the weak Le Chatelier principle was
given above for a zero-sum game.
Here we restricted ourselves with perturbations of the
state, i.e., the probability vector x. The Le Chatelier
principle should also be studied for structural perturba-
tion that do not act directly on the state x, but influence
the structure of the system making the transition prob-
abilities Wi6=k[x, λt] time-dependent via a parameter λt;
see [10] for the relevance of such perturbations in ecology.
There is a long history of applying thermodynamic sta-
bility principles to bio-ecological systems; see [21, 42–46].
These studies are definitely thought-provoking, e.g., an
observation by Trincher [21] that the qualitative state-
ment of the Le Chatelier principle is to be violated in
the processes of embryogenesis inspired the present work
(cf. with the above discussion on the punctuated equi-
librium).
However, the basic tool in almost all such applications
is the notion of entropy production, whose features (e.g.,
positivity) are invoked for making predictions about the
stability of a bio-ecological system. This approach lacks
operationalism, because for the entropy production to be
well defined one should assume that the considered bio-
ecological system is literally thermodynamical, i.e., that
concepts developed within physics (thermodynamic equi-
librium, the notions of entropy, temperature, forces and
fluxes) apply. Obviously, an open and non-equilibrium
bio-ecological system produces entropy somewhere and
somehow, but one needs specific conditions for apply-
ing concepts developed within physics; in particular, it
has to be verified that the formally introduced entropy
production indeed has a physical meaning. This is best
examplified by the current literature, e.g. Refs. [44–47]
that claim to apply the entropy production concept to
the same population dynamic models, all employ differ-
ent definitions of this concept (albeit some of these defini-
tions become equivalent in the vicinity of the rest-point;
see [45–47]). In contrast, the presented application of
Le Chatelier principle is based on the operational notion
of perturbation decay. Hence, its application need not
assume any would-be-valid thermodynamic reasoning.
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